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RECONSIDERING ROE V WADE:
EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS AS AN
ALTERNATIVE APPROACH
KATHRYN HOLMES SNEDAKER*

I. INTRODUCTION

On June 11, 1986, thirteen years after the United States Supreme Court
held in Roe v. Wade' that the right of privacy encompasses a woman's
right to seek an abortion, the Supreme Court narrowly reaffirmed the
abortion right in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists,' in a 5-4 decision.3 The fact that another abortion case
was before the Court is not, by itself, particularly noteworthy. Indeed,
the Court has considered at least ten such cases in the years since Roe a-confronting the abortion issue and interpreting the scope of its original
decision. What is worthy of comment, however, is the fact that, while
upholding its earlier decision, the ruling demonstrates sharp and deepening divisions among the nine justices over whether the 1973 ruling was
correct. Indeed, all four dissenters raise strong concerns about Roe with
several justices expressly urging that Roe be overturned. 5 Should the Court
*Member, Class of 1987, University of New Mexico School of Law; M.A. 1984, University of
New Mexico; B.A. 1980, University of Utah. This Article was one of the top three papers selected
for recognition in the 1986 University of New Mexico School of Law Annual Alumni Association
Student Paper Competition. The author wishes to acknowledge Ann C. Scales, Associate Professor,
University of New Mexico Law School, for inspiration and guidance in preparation of this Article.
1. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
2. 54 U.S.L.W. 4618, 4621 (1986) striking down as unconstitutional several provisions of Pennsylvania's 1982 Abortion Control Act.
3. Earlier this term, the Supreme Court considered another abortion case, Diamond v. Charles,
54 U.S.L.W. 4418 (1986), challenging requirements mandating the standard of care required of
physicians performing abortions and requiring physicians to give their patients certain information
when prescribing certain types of birth control. The Diamond opinion dismissed the appeal for want
of jurisdiction. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4419.
4. In the years following the Roe ruling, the Supreme Court has confronted the abortion issue
on at least ten different occasions: Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973) (the companion case to Roe);
Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Bellotti v. Baird, 428
U.S. 132 (1976) (Bellotti ); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977);
Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Bellotti v. Baird,
443 U.S. 622 (1979) (Belloti I[); Hams v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); H.L. v. Matheson, 450
U.S. 398 (1981); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
Planned Parenthood Association of Kansas City, Missouri, Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983);
Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
5. Justices Burger and White expressly advocated that Roe be reexamined, 54 U.S.L.W. at 4628,
4631, while Justices O'Connor and Rehnquist declined to comment on the issue, stating that the
question of whether to reconsider Roe was not properly before the Court. Nonetheless, O'Connor's
dissent, in which Rehnquist joined, reaffirmed the position taken by O'Connor in Akron, 103 S.Ct.
2481, 2504, wherein she raised strong questions about Roe.
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choose to reconsider Roe, it could put an end to the continuous series of
legislative and judicial struggles that have marked the years since Roe;
it could, on the other hand, merely shift the focus of the debate.
This Article examines the Roe decision, the doctrine of privacy on
which that decision is based, and the problems inherent in a privacy
approach to the abortion controversy. This Article then speculates on the
options available to the Court, assuming arguendo it reconsiders Roe as
urged by the Thornburgh dissenters. Specifically, this Article considers
the equal protection doctrine as an alternative approach to abortion cases.
Finally, this Article analyzes the advantages and disadvantages an equal
protection approach provides over a privacy approach in the context of
the abortion controversy.
II. ROE V. WADE AND THE DOCTRINE OF PRIVACY
A. The Decision of Roe v. Wade
In Roe6 and its companion case, Doe v. Bolton,7 the Supreme Court
invalidated statutes prohibiting abortion in other than exceptional circumstances, holding that those statutes unjustifiably infringed upon a woman's
right of privacy.' The Roe decision provides the analytical framework for
subsequent abortion decisions-a framework expressly intended to balance the state's interests against the privacy right of the woman. 9
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority, cautioned that the right of
privacy is a limited one to be considered against important, countervailing
state interests.' 0 The majority viewed the woman's decision as a fundamental right; the Court, therefore, applied the principle that only a compelling state interest, pursued through narrowly tailored legislation, can
survive the strict scrutiny invoked to assess a statute's constitutionality."
The Court articulated two important state interests-the preservation of
maternal health and the protection of fetal life-noting that each interest
6. 410 U.S. at 113. In Roe, a pregnant, single woman (Mary Roe) brought a class action suit
challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion statutes which prohibited obtaining
or attempting to obtain an abortion unless it is for the purpose of saving the mother's life.
7. 410 U.S. 179 (1973). In Doe, the plaintiff attacked the validity of specific procedural standards
prescribed by a Georgia statute, alleging that the statute resulted in an impermissible invasion of
her right of privacy and was unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 185-86.
8. Id. at 164, 201. The Roe opinion announced the rationale for the holding in both cases on the
abortion issue. See Id. at 189.
9. The Court concluded that its analysis was "consistent with the relative weights of the respective
interests involved, with the lessons and examples of medical and legal history, with the lenity of
the common law, and with the demands of the profound problems of the present day." Id. at 165.
10. Id. at 154. The Court stated: "[Tihe right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision,
but . . . this right is not unqualified and must be considered against important state interests in
regulation." Id.
11. Id.
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becomes "compelling" at different points of the pregnancy.' 2 In order to
accommodate these state interests, as well as the woman's fundamental
right, the Court utilized a framework dividing pregnancy into three trimesters. During the first trimester no state interest is considered compelling; 3
therefore, the state has no authority to regulate abortions.' 4 At the outset
of the second trimester the state's interest in maternal health is determined
to be compelling, and thus the state can regulate the procedure as long
as such regulation is reasonably related to maternal health.' 5 At the beginning of the third trimester, the point at which the fetus is presumably
viable, the state has a compelling justification for regulation-protecting
"potential human life."' 6 At this latter stage of pregnancy the state can
regulate abortions to the extent of proscribing
them, except where nec7
essary to preserve maternal health.'
The Roe framework is based, therefore, first on whether the statute
substantially infringes on a fundamental right. Once that infringement is
established, a strict scrutiny standard is employed, and a statute will be.
struck down if the state does not have a compelling interest or if, even
though there is a compelling state interest, there is a less restrictive
alternative means to achieve the statute's purpose. If, on the other hand,
no infringement of a fundamental right can be established, then a strict
scrutiny test is not appropriate, and the statute must be merely rationally
related to the end it is meant to achieve. Under this relaxed standard, a
statute will likely be upheld as constitutional.
B. The Doctrine of Privacy as the Basis of the Roe Decision
In an effort to understand the Roe ruling, and the internal weaknesses
in the decision, it is useful to examine the nature and historical devel12. Id. at 162-63.
13. The Court's basis for this determination was that "present medical knowledge" indicated that
until the end of the first trimester, the mortality rate for abortion was lower than the mortality rate
for normal childbirth. Id. at 163.
14. Id.
15. Examples of regulations the Court considered permissible during the second trimester included
licensing requirements as to the qualifications of the person performing the abortion, the licensing
of the facility in which the abortion would be performed, and the nature of the facility in which the
procedure would take place. Id.
16. Id. at 159. While refusing to acknowledge the fetus as a human life, the Court adopted the
term "potential human life" to describe the status of the fetus. The Court disposed of the argument
that fetal life constituted human life by an exercise in inverse logic. The majority stated that:
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained
in the respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to
arrive at any consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's
knowledge, is not in a position to speculate as to the answer.
Id. at 159.
17. Id. at 163-64.
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opment of the legal principle underlying Roe. Fundamental to the Roe
framework is the concept of privacy.
Acknowledging that the Constitution does not expressly mention a
privacy right,' 8 the Roe Court finds "that a right of personal privacy, or
a guarantee of certain zones of privacy, does exist under the Constitution. " The privacy right is deemed fundamental--one that is "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty." 20 Thus, the Court, in the Roe opinion,
located privacy within the personal liberty protected by the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.21
The early cases involving privacy matters found roots of the privacy23
22
right in the First Amendment; in the Fourth and Fifth Amendments;
in the penumbras of the Bill of Rights; 24 in the Ninth Amendment; 2 or
in the concept of liberty guaranteed by the first section of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 26 Relative to abortion, the important privacy cases can be
divided into two categories: (1) those involved in marriage and the family,
including the raising of children; and (2) those connected with contraception and procreation. 27
The first category is comprised of cases wherein the Court declared
unconstitutional statutes which amounted to an arbitrary restriction of
liberties guaranteed by substantive due process. Meyer v. Nebraska28 and
Pierce v. Society of Sisters29 dealt with the education of children. Meyer
arose from a Nebraska ordinance which prohibited the teaching of any
modem language except English. In overturning the law on due process
grounds, the Court said:
Without doubt, [the liberty guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the
right of the individual . . . to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, . . .and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized
at common law as essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by
free men.3°
18. Id. at 152.
19. Id.
20. Id., quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937).
21. 410 U.S. at 153.
22. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969).
23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 8-9 (1968), Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967),
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886), see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478
(1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
24. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484-85 (1965).
25. Id. at 486 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
26. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923).
27. Patton, Roe v. Wade: Its Impact on Rights of Choice in Human Reproduction, 5 COLUM.
HUMAN RIGHTS L. REV. 506-07 (1974).
28. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
29. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
30. Meyer, 263 U.S. at 399.
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The Pierce case involved an Oregon statute which made it compulsory
that children between the ages of eight and sixteen attend only public
schools. This statute was also nullified because the Court felt that it
"unreasonably interferes with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct
the upbringing and education of children under their control." 3'
At issue in Loving v. Virginia3" was an anti-miscegenation law. Although the Virginia statute was invalidated primarily on equal protection
grounds, the Court took the opportunity to reiterate the special status of
marriage rights under the due process clause:
These statutes also deprive the Lovings of liberty without due process
of law in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. The freedom to marry has long been recognized as one
of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness
by free men."
The second category of decisions involving privacy include procreation
and contraception. In Skinner v. Oklahoma,3 4 the issue was a state law
which allowed court-ordered sterilization of a felon who had been convicted three times. The Court struck down the law because it violated
the equal protection clause. The Court went on, however, to add an
important dictum to the effect that it considered the right to procreate to
be a fundamental liberty: "We are dealing here with legislation which
involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." 35
Another important step in the development of privacy was taken in
Griswold v. Connecticut.36 The concern in Griswold was a Connecticut
law banning the use or information about the use of contraceptives by
married couples. In overturning the statute the Court declared that the
marriage relationship, including the right to use contraceptives, is protected by a zone of privacy and that the Connecticut statute was an
unconstitutional invasion of that privacy.37 While seven justices agreed
Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534-35
388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 12.
316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Id. at 541.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Id. at 484.
The present case, then, concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy
created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees. And it concerns a law
which, in forbidding the use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale, seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact upon that relationship .... Would we allow the police to search the sacred
precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The
very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.
Id. at 485-86 (emphasis in original).
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
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about the existence of the right, they differed over its source.38 As far as
the evolution of privacy is concerned, however, the creation of this right
relative to procreation was more important than its source. While Skinner
classified procreation as a fundamental right, Griswold declared that procreationprevention within the marital relationship is also a fundamental
right guaranteed by the Constitution. Once the woman's right to prevent
conception had been secured, it was to be expected that the right to
prevent childbirth after conception would soon become a constitutional
issue.
Before the connection between privacy and the right to abortion became
explicit in Roe, the Eisenstadt v. Baird39 ruling provided an essential link.
In Eisenstadt, the Court extended the right of privacy with respect to
procreation to single individuals. The Massachusetts statute in issue permitted physicians and pharmacists to dispense contraceptives to married
couples for the prevention of pregnancy but prohibited their distribution
to single persons for the same purpose. The Court overturned the statute,
holding that the law was an unconstitutional infringement on the right of
privacy: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether to bear or beget a child."' Thus, the Court found the right of
privacy extensive enough to permit the prevention of a pregnancy.
As is apparent from this overview of cases, the Supreme Court has
uncovered a right of privacy which extends to activities relating to marriage, child rearing, contraception, procreation and education. As the
concept has developed from Meyer through Eisenstadt, the trend of the
Court has been to expand the boundaries of privacy to embrace an ever
greater number of freedoms. The common theme running through all
these decisions has been the right of individuals and families to control
those decisions which integrally affect their lives. It was at this stage in
the evolution of privacy that the Court applied a privacy analysis to the
abortion issue in Roe. The Court once again extended the concept, stating:
38. Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, held that the first, third, fourth, fifth and ninth
amendments create penumbras of rights, 381 U.S. at 484, and that these penumbras are made
applicable to the states by virtue of the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 482. The guarantees contained
in the penumbra of rights create zones of privacy. Id. at 485. The marriage relationship is protected
by one of these zones of privacy. Id. Justice Goldberg, concurring, finds the:
Concept of liberty protects those personal rights that are fundamental . ..that it
embraces the right of marital privacy though that fight is not mentioned explicitly
in the constitution . . . [and finds support for this view] both by numerous decisions of this Court . . .and by the language and history of the Ninth Amendment.
Id. at 486-87.
39. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
40. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
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"This right of privacy . . . is broad enough to encompass a woman's

decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy."4"
C. Problems Inherent in the Roe Approach
As could be expected in a case involving an issue as controversial as
a woman's right to have an abortion, the Roe v. Wade decision inspired
a wide array of analyses, observations, and criticisms. Those who argued
that a woman's right to have an abortion is the right of a woman alone
to decide what to do with her body were dissatisfied with the Court's
decision because it placed restrictions on that right.4" Abortion critics
cried out that the decision gave women the right to choose abortion on
demand, "a practical license for elective abortion at any stage, right up
to the last minute before normal delivery."4 3 In addition, constitutional
scholars were critical of the opinion, arguing there was no constitutional
basis for finding that the privacy notion embodied in either the Bill of
Rights or the remainder of the Constitution encompasses a woman's right
to control her body." In their view, the Court did not provide a satisfactory
rationale for its conclusion that abortion is one of those rights included
in the constitutional guarantee of personal privacy.4"
Recently, Justices of the Supreme Court have joined the ranks of critics,
seeking a reversal of Roe on the merits. In City ofAkron v. Akron Center
for Reproductive Health, Inc.,46 Justice O'Connor, joined by Justices
White and Rehnquist (who dissented in Roe), dissented from the Court's
decision holding that direct state interference in the physician-patient
relationship is outside the ambit of state authority,47 which is limited to
legislation that comports with "accepted medical practice."" Justice
O'Connor began her dissent with sharp criticism of the trimester approach
to abortion jurisprudence, labeling it unworkable and unable to accommodate mutually antagonistic rights and interests.49 She rejected the Court's
holding that advancements in medical technology had decreased the state's
discretion in confining second trimester abortions to hospitals. O'Connor
41. Roe, 410 U.S. at 153.
42. See, e.g., Ginsburg, Some Thoughts on Autonomy and Equality in Relation to Roe v. Wade,
63 N.C.L. REV. 375 (1985); Jones, Abortion and the Considerationof Fundamental,Irreconcilable
Interests, 33 SYRACUSE L. REV. 565 (1982).
43. Rice, The Dred Scott Case of the Twentieth Century, 10 Hous. L. REV. 1059, 1062 (1973).
44. See, e.g., Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920
(1973). See generally Tribe, The Supreme Court, 1972 Term-Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles
in The Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1973).
45. The Roe Court simply stated: "This right of privacy.., is broad enough to encompass a
woman's decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." 410 U.S. at 153.
46. 462 U.S 416 (1983).
47. Id. at 421.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 440.
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asserted that despite the majority's claimed adherence to the Roe framework, it had "blurred" the bright lines drawn by that decision. 50 The
dissent noted that advancements in medical technology will inexorably
delay the point at which the state's interest in maternal health becomes
compelling. Conversely, science increasingly will advance the point of
viability and, consequently, the point at which the state may proscribe
nontherapeutic abortions to preserve fetal life. Thus perceived, the dissent
concluded that the Roe framework is "on a collision course with itself."51
In addition to Justice O'Connor highlighting the weaknesses inherent
in the Roe framework, the rationale adopted by the Akron Court in its
defense of Roe also suggests Roe's weakness. Akron did not offer new
reasons supporting Roe; it merely invoked stare decisis. Invoking this
doctrine in support of a weak rationale magnifies the latter's weakness
as it demonstrates that no better rationale is available. Furthermore, invoking stare decisis to support a constitutional decision magnifies its
weakness even more, as stare decisis constrains the Court less in constitutional interpretation than in other areas of law.53 Indeed, the Court
admits that the doctrine of stare decisis is "never entirely persuasive on
a constitutional question, ' 54 and at the same time finds the doctrine
controlling in Akron. Thus, by finding that stare decisis requires reaffirming Roe the Court highlights the weakness of Roe.
The Court's defense of Roe in Akron may actually enhance Roe's
ripeness for judicial reconsideration. Recognizing that it must retain control over questions of constitutional interpretation, 55 the Court after Akron
likely will be more receptive than before to an argument that Roe should
be abandoned. Most recently, the 6-3 majority in Akron was reduced to
5-4 in Thornburgh, with Chief Justice Burger switching sides, voting to
reexamine Roe.56 Thus, taken together with the changes in composition
of the Court, the time appears near when the Supreme Court may be
willing to reconsider the Roe approach.
D. Alternative Approaches Should the Court Reconsider Roe
Should the Court succumb to the urgings of the dissenting justices,
50. Id. at 441.
51. Id. at 442. Justice O'Connor determined that, under the majority's opinion, "the State must
continuously and conscientiously study contemporary medical and scientific literature in order to
determine whether the effect of a particular regulation is to 'depart from accepted medical practice'
insofar as particular procedures and particular periods within the trimester are concerned." Id. at
441.
52. Id. at 422; see also id. at 422 n. 1.
53. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671 n.14 (1974) (citing Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406, 408 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
54. Akron, 462 U.S. at 422.
55. See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5. U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 173-74 (1803).
56. 54 U.S.L.W. at 4628.
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among others, there are at least three approaches the Court may choose
to consider. First, the Court could refuse to continue this line of substantive due process adjudication, and, just as with economic due process
adjudication, 7 dismiss the substantive due process premise as not in
concert with the constitutional proposition that courts do not substitute
their value judgment for that of the legislative bodies." Because such an
approach would nullify any constitutional basis for a woman's right to
an abortion, and would result in differing rights depending upon the
jurisdiction in which the woman resides, this approach is not an appropriate solution to the Roe dilemma.
Second, the Court could adopt the approach advocated by Justice
O'Connor in her dissent from Akron.59 Because the lines of the trimester
approach have been "blurred," resulting from improvements in medical
technology moving forward the state's compelling interest in the mother's
health, and moving backward the state's compelling interest in the potentiality of human life,' O'Connor suggested the Court depart from
stare decisis and set a new course.61
In establishing an alternative legal framework, O'Connor developed a
two-part test. In the first step, it must be determined whether the law
unduly burdens the woman's right to obtain an abortion. 62 "Undue burden,"
in this sense, means "situations involving absolute obstacles or severe
limitations on the abortion decision." 63 If an undue burden cannot be
found, the inquiry is then limited to whether the law is rationally related
to a legitimate state purpose. 6' If the law is found to be unduly burdensome, the Court will employ the second part of the test, namely, the
"compelling state interest" standard. 65 For purposes of this test, the state's
interest becomes compelling throughout the pregnancy, both in the moth57. See, e.g., Jay Burns Baking Co. v. Bryan, 264 U.S. 504 (1924); Adkins v. Children's Hospital,
261 U.S. 525 (1923); Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45
(1905).
58. See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726, 730. A full discussion of this controversy is outside
the scope of this Paper. For a more thorough discussion of the issues, see Ely, The Wages of Crying
Wolf. A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973); Richards, Sexual Autonomy and the
ConstitutionalRight to Privacy:A Case Study in Human Rights and the Unwritten Constitution, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 957 (1979); Brest, The FundamentalRights Controversy:The EssentialContradictions
of Normative ConstitutionalScholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981).
59. 462 U.S. at452 (O'Connor, J.,dissenting).
60. Id. at 458. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
61. Id. at 459.
62. Id. at 462.
63. Id. at 464. For example, Justice O'Connor found that the second trimester hospitalization
requirement, the parental consent requirement, and the informed consent requirements do not impose
an undue burden on the woman's right to seek an abortion. See Id. at 467 (second trimester
hospitalization requirement); Simopolous, 462 U.S. at 506 (parental consent requirement); Ashcroft,
462 U.S. at 476 (informed consent requirement).
64. Akron, 462 U.S. at 462.
65. Id. at 463.
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er's health and in potential human life.6 6 A state regulation, therefore,
will easily be upheld if it is reasonably related to the state's interest in
either the mother's health or the life of the fetus.
This approach is unacceptable because, though framed as a qualification
on the right to seek an abortion, in actuality it operates nearly to eliminate
that right. The state's interest would be compelling throughout the pregnancy, making it nearly impossible for the woman's right of privacy to
overcome the compelling interest of the state. Additionally, this approach
gives very little guidance as to just how burdensome a burden must be
before it is deemed "undue," and who is to make such a determination.
Therefore, this approach is not an appropriate solution to the Roe dilemma.
Third, the Court could shift its focus in abortion cases and view abortion
as raising issues of inequality; that is, presenting the issue of a woman's
right to take autonomous charge of her full life's course, of her ability
to stand in relation to man, society, and the state as an independent, selfsustaining, equal citizen.67 This approach is the most appropriate solution
to the Roe dilemma-not only does the approach avoid the trimester
analysis, it also avoids the substantive due process controversy, and, in
addition, offers a unified theory for adjudication of women's rights issues.
III. AN ALTERNATIVE APPROACH: EQUAL PROTECTION DOCTRINE
Up to this point, the Supreme Court has compartmentalized two related
areas of constitutional adjudication: reproductive autonomy and genderbased classifications. The Court has analyzed reproductive autonomy
under a substantive due process/personal autonomy/right of privacy approach not explicitly linked to discrimination against women;68 it has
analyzed classifications by gender under an equal protection/sex discrimination approach.69 This section will briefly explore the background and
development of the equal protection/sex discrimination approach as it is
now applied by the Supreme Court, and will suggest an alternative theory
of equal protection analysis which, in addition to solving the dilemma
created by Roe,7" serves as a unified approach for women's rights issues.
A. The CurrentEqual Protection Doctrine as Applied to Gender
Discrimination
The pivotal case for women's rights adjudication under the equal pro66. Id. at 460-61.
67. See Karst, Foreword: Equal Citizenship Under the FourteenthAmendment, 91 HARV. L. REV.
I, 57-59 (1977).
68. See supra notes 6-41 and accompanying text.
69. See infra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 42-56 and accompanying text.
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tection doctrine came in Reed v. Reed.7 Prior to this point, the Supreme
Court had rejected virtually every effort to overturn sex-based classifications. 72 The Court's approach to women's issues prior to Reed is epitomized by the now notorious concurring opinion of Supreme Court Justice
Bradley in Bradwell v. Illinois,7 3 an 1872 decision affirming the right of
a state to exclude women from the practice of law:
Man is, or should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural
and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to the female sex
evidently unfits it for many of the occupations of civil life. The
constitution of the family organization, which is founded in the divine
ordinance, as well as in the nature of things, indicates the domestic
sphere as that which properly belongs to the domain and functions
of womanhood.74

In the unanimous Reed decision, however, the Court announced that an
Idaho statute giving men preference over women in administering estates,
denied women the equal protection of the laws." Thus, the Reed decision
marked the first solid break from the Supreme Court's consistent rejection
of women's complaints of unconstitutional gender-based discrimination.
The Reed Court purported to apply the minimal rational classification
standard; the appropriate standard of review of gender classifications was

openly addressed in Frontiero v. Richardson.77 In Frontiero, the Court

faced the issue of whether married women in the military could be denied
fringe benefits-such as family housing and health care allowancesaccorded married men in military service. Although holding such a denial
was a violation of the equal protection clause,"g the Court was unable to
reach a majority as to the basis for such a determination. Seven justices
agreed the practice violated the equal protection clause, however, they
differed as to the standard to be applied in reaching such a determinationthe plurality 79 applied a strict scrutiny standard; the concurring justices"
applied something less than strict scrutiny.8
71. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
72. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948);
Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
73. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 130 (1872).
74. Id. at 141.
75. 404 U.S. at 77.
76. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
77. 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
78. Id.at 691.
79. Justices Brennan, Douglas, White and Marshall concluded classifications based upon sex,
like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect and, therefore,
subject to strict judicial scrutiny. Id. at 688.
80. Justices Powell, Burger, C.J., and Blackmun refused to find sex-based classifications inherently suspect, citing for authority Reed. Id. at 691-92.
81. Id. at 692.
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In Craig v. Boren,82 challenging a statute differentiating between the
ages of boys and girls permitted to buy 3.2 beer, a majority of the Justices
finally agreed upon an "intermediate" standard of review for gender
classifications-presumably intermediate between the rational classification and suspect classification standards. Thus, this first line of gender
classification cases established the standard of review for such cases: in
order to withstand judicial scrutiny a classification based on gender "must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related
to achievement of those objectives."83
The Reed-Frontiero-Craigbreak from a century's precedent was not
clear and clean, however. A second line of gender classification cases,
also argued on a discrimination basis, proved more problematic for the
Court. This line concerned sex-specific traits; most notably, pregnancy.
In Cleveland Board of Educationv. LaFleur,84 the Court decided an issue
brought by pregnant school teachers forced to terminate their employment,
or take unpaid maternity leave, months before the anticipated birth date.
Policies singling out pregnant women for disadvantageous treatment discriminated invidiously on the bases of sex, the teachers argued. The Court
bypassed that argument, however, and instead rested its decision, holding
mandatory maternity leaves unconstitutional, on due process grounds."
Later that same year, in Geduldig v. Aiello,86 the Court held that a state
operated disability income protection plan could exclude pregnancy without offending the equal protection guarantees.8 7 The classifications in these
disability cases, according to the Court, were not gender-based on their
face, and were not shown to have any sex-discriminatory effect. Indeed,
the Court reasoned, "the program divides potential recipients into two
groups-pregnant women and nonpregnant persons." 88 As noted by the
Court, all nonpregnant persons, women along with men, were treated
alike.89
Thus, the current doctrine of equal protection for gender classifications
which discriminate against women demands an intermediate scrutiny of
such classifications, and, at the same time, finds that laws governing
reproductive biology-i.e., pregnancy-raise no gender classification
82. 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
83. Id. at 197.
84. 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
85. Id. at 639-50.
86. 417 U.S. 484 (1974).
87. Id. at 494.
88. Id. at 496-97 n.20.
89. See also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976) (challenge brought under Title
VII held women unable to work due to pregnancy or childbirth could be excluded from disability
coverage).
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concerns. This is so because, from this view, social equality means that
likes should be treated alike, and differences should be treated differently.
It is this underlying assumption that gives rise to the "pregnancy" exception. The present standard, therefore, is that "similarly situated" persons should be treated the same, but, where there is a biological differencei.e., the capacity to become pregnant-there is no similar situation and,
therefore, no necessity for similar treatment.' This approach denies the
core reality that sex-based biological differences are related to gender.
At the same time the Court was grappling with what standard should
be applied in reviewing classifications that discriminate against women,
a third line of cases began coming before the Court. The issue presented
by this strand was the constitutionality of classifications that give preferential treatment to women, otherwise referred to as "benign" discrimination.
The benign discrimination cases of the early 1970's reflect the uncertainity of the Court with regard to the appropriate standard of judicial
review to be given gender cases in general. Indeed, the early benign
discrimination cases, for example, Kahn v. Shevin,9" and Schlesinger v.
Ballard,92 were decided before the Court had reached agreement on what
standard of review should be applied even in nonpreferential discrimination cases. Shortly after the Craig intermediate scrutiny standard was
announced, however, the Court decided two benign cases which, taken
together, are read to apply the same, or a similar, standard to benign
discrimination classifications as had been applied to other discriminatory
gender classifications.
Califano v. Goldfarb93 concerned social security provisions which qualified a widow for survivors' benefits automatically, yet required proof of
a widower that his wife supplied three-fourths of the couple's support
before the widower qualified for the same benefits. Review of the legislative history in this case indicated no purpose to act affirmatively to
improve women's status in economic endeavor.94 On the contrary, the
disparate treatment Congress ordered for widows and widowers simply
reflected longstanding "habit"; 95 the discrimination encountered by wid90. Professor Catharine MacKinnon refers to this as the "differences" approach. C. MacKinnon,
Sexual Harassment of Working Women: A Case of Sex Discrimination(1979). See infra notes 99101 and accompanying text.
91. 416 U.S. 351 (1974) (upholding an 1885 Florida law providing a $15.00 annual real property
tax saving for widows, along with the blind and the totally disabled).
92. 419 U.S. 498 (1975) (holding that it was not a denial of equal protection to hold a male
naval officer to a strict "up or out" system (out when twice passed over for promotion), while
guaranteeing a female officer thirteen years before mandatory discharge for lack of promotion).
93. 430 U.S. 199 (1977).
94. Id. at 212-17.
95. Id. at 222.
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ower Goldfarb was "merely the accidental byproduct of [the legislators']
traditional way of thinking about females." 96
Califano v. Webster97 reviewed a classification establishing a more
favorable social security benefit calculation for retired female workers
than for retired male workers. The legislative history of this classification,
contrary to Goldfarb, indicated the scheme had been enacted in direct
response to adverse discriminatory conditions encountered by gainfully
employed women-specifically, lower wages for "women's work" and98
early retirement employers routinely forced on women, but not on men.
Taken together, Goldfarb and Webster establish the following standard
for gender classifications which give preferential treatment to women:
(1) Where, as in Webster, legislation directly addresses past discrimination
and serves to ameliorate it, differential treatment of the sexes, at least as
a temporary measure, is constitutional. (2) Where, as in Goldfarb, disparate treatment is rooted in traditional stereotyping and is not deliberately
and specifically aimed at redressing past discrimination, differential treatment based on sex is unconstitutional. Thus, the Court will uphold a
preferential gender classification only if such classification was in fact
adopted by the legislature for remedial reasons rather than out of prejudice
about "the way women are" and, even then, only if the classification is
closely tailored to the remedial end.
As this brief overview of women's rights cases demonstrates, the Court
has viewed explicit gender-based classifications, pregnancy issues, benign
discrimination differentiation, and abortion and contraception cases each
in their separate and largely independent cubbyholes. The Court needs
to take each of these issues out of their individual compartments, acknowledge their practical interrelationships, and treat these matters as
presenting various facets of a single issue-gender equality and the role
of women in society.
B. A "New" Equal ProtectionApproach: Gender Equality and the
Role of Women in Society
An alternative approach, advocated by Professor Catharine MacKinnon, among others," attempts to deal with the pervasive totality of
gender-based discrimination. MacKinnon describes gender discrimination
as a systematic construct that defines women as inferior to men and that
"cumulatively disadvantages women for their differences from men, as
96. Id. at 223.
97. 430 U.S. 313 (1977).
98. Id. at 317-20.
99. See MacKinnon, supra note 90. See also Scales, Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence, 56 IND.
L.J. 375 (1981); Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv. 955 (1984).
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well as ignores their similarities.""°° MacKinnon contrasts this approach,
which she labels an "inequality" approach, to the current equal protection
doctrine, which she labels a "differences" approach."'
Fundamental to the inequality approach is the notion that. if women
are to achieve fully equal status in American society, including a sharing
of power traditionally held by men and a retaining of control of their
bodies, our understanding of gender classifications must encompass a
strong constitutional equality guarantee regarding a woman's right to take
autonomous charge of her life, of her ability to function as an independent,
self-sustaining, equal citizen.' 02 This approach requires a broadening of
the meaning of equality; it requires the concept of equality to include all
choices people have in their lives. Viewed in this way, equality means
the right not to have one's life bifurcated between career and family; it
means the right to control one's own social roles.' 3
From an inequality perspective, the test in any challenge would be
"whether the policy or practice in question integrally contributes to the
maintenance of an underclass or a deprived position because of gender
status.""0 If the classification is determined to contribute to the continued
oppression of women, the court must then consider whether the law has
a substantial impact on perpetuating the inequality of women. If so, the
court must engage in traditional strict scrutiny analysis to see whether
the law is justified by a compelling state interest.
Thus, the inequality test departs from the current equal protection
analysis in that it does not require any comparison between allegedly
similarly situated classes of people. 05 This departure is necessary because
laws governing reproductive biology, by definition govern ways in which
men and women are not similarly situated. "0Additionally, this test requires a strict scrutiny analysis of gender classifications contributing to
the oppression of women, rather than the intermediate scrutiny analysis
currently applied to gender cases. Thus, from this view, variables as to
which men and women are not comparable, such as pregnancy or sexuality, would be the first to trigger strict scrutiny. '°7
From this "new" equality perspective then, "[t]he abortion question
[is] not merely a 'women versus fetuses' issue; it [is] also a feminist
issue, an issue going to women's position in society in relation to men." °8
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

See MacKinnon, supra note 90 at116.
Id. at 102. See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See Karst, supra note 67 at 57-59.
See Karst, supra note 67 at 58.
See MacKinnon, supra note 90 at 117.
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See Law, supra note 99 at 1009.
MacKinnon, supra note 90 at 118.
Karst, supra note 67 at 58.
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The focus of equal protection here is not a right of access to contraceptives, or a right to an abortion, but a right to take responsibility for
choosing one's own future. "1 It is the right to respect one's own ability
to make responsible choices in controlling one's own destiny; the right
to be an active participant in society. t'
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS
Once the underlying assumption regarding the scope of equality is
broadened-from one meaning that likes should be treated alike and
differences should be treated differently, 1 ' to one meaning that persons
have the right to control one's own social roles, the right to control one's
own future " 2 -conceptualizing the abortion question as an equality issue
follows quite naturally. Women are the persons who must bear children
and who, in our society, most often assume primary, and in many cases
sole, child-rearing responsibilities. Such responsibilities so substantially
affect women in terms of their health, careers, and lifestyles, that it seems
natural to argue that women should have the right to make and execute
the basic decisions involved in bearing or not bearing children. Without
the full capacity to limit her own reproduction, a woman is not being
allowed to make responsible choices in controlling her own destiny or to
be an active participant in society in relation to men. Viewed in this way,
abortion prohibition is solidly linked with discrimination against women."'
Additionally, an equality approach alleviates the necessity of continuing
the unworkable privacy trimester test for determining when strict scrutiny
is triggered." 4 Rather, the "inequality" test is substituted, which asks
whether the practice contributes to the maintenance of a deprived position
based on gender." 5 If the classification is determined to contribute to the
continued oppression of women, the court must then consider whether
the law has a substantial impact on perpetuating the inequality of women.
If so, strict scrutiny applies to determine whether the law is justified by
a compelling state interest.116 From this approach then, the interest of the
woman becomes the central focus on the inquiry.
In the context of the abortion decision, limitations on abortion procedure clearly contribute to the oppression of women and have a substantial impact on perpetuating the inequality of women.' Thus, from
109.
110.
1i1.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.

See generally Karst, supra note 67.
Henkin, Privacy and Autonomy, 74 COLUM. L. REv. 1410 (1974).
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
See Karst supra note 67 at 58.
See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
Id.
See supra notes 111-13 and accompanying text.
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an equality approach, all statutes limiting abortion procedure would be
subject to strict scrutiny review. But the equality approach does more
than simply raise the level of judicial scrutiny; the equality approach also
changes the weight of the asserted interests in abortion cases. For example, under the privacy doctrine, the weight of the asserted interestwhether woman's, state's or fetus'-is determined according to the period
of the pregnancy during which an abortion is sought. From an equality
perspective, however, the trimester approach is eliminated and the central
concern is the woman's equality right. The woman's right is expressly
considered the predominant interest at all times throughout the pregnancy.
Thus perceived, the other asserted interests of protecting maternal health
and fetal life necessarily diminish. The woman's equality right will easily
trump the state's asserted interest in protecting maternal health as such
a regulation is paternalistic and contributes to the oppression of women.
Similarly, the woman's equality right will prevail over the state's asserted
interest in protecting fetal life. Rather than vesting the state with the
discretion to determine "moral personhood," the equality approach recognizes the woman as a person competent to make this normative judgment."'8 From this approach then, the woman's equality right remains
the central focus of the inquiry, with the woman perceived as a competent,
responsible person capable of making difficult moral and ethical decisions.
Moreover, conceptualizing abortion as an equality issue avoids the
problematic privacy right/substantive due process issue;" 9 the right to
receive "equal protection of the laws" is clearly grounded in constitutional
text."'2 Finally, the "new" equality approach provides a single, unified
right for women's issues-specifically, reproductive choice-instead of
several discrete constitutional rights, for example, to procreate, to use
contraceptives, and to obtain an abortion. 2'
Theoretically, therefore, the "new" equality approach seems to provide
a reasonable, and preferable alternative to the Roe dilemma. The following
sections of this Article will consider the equality approach a bit more
critically, comparing the doctrines of privacy and equality in the context
of post-Roe abortion decisions, and reflecting on the potential problems
created by adoption of the equality approach.
A. A Comparison of Privacy and Equality Doctrines in the Post-Roe
Abortion Context
The Roe privacy doctrine asks the court to consider whether: (1) the
118. See McCoy, Logic v. Value Judgment in Legal and Ethical Thought, 23
1277 (1970).
119. See supra notes 18-21, 44-45 and 57-58 and accompanying text.
120. U.S. Const. amend. XIV, sec. 1.
121. See supra notes 71-98 and accompanying text.

VAND.

L.

REV.
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state's regulation of procedure, during the second trimester, is reasonably
related to maternal health, or (2) the state's regulation of procedure, during
the third trimester, is reasonably related to protecting potential human
life. 2' The equality principle advocated here considers whether the state
can meet the burden of proving that a regulation: (1) has no significant
impact in perpetuating the inequality of women or, if it does further
oppression of women, whether it (2) is the best means for meeting a
compelling state purpose.

23

As noted above, 124 it is clear that, from an equality stance, the women's
right to an abortion is constitutionally quaranteed. Thus, the question at
this point is whether the equality principle adequately addresses the subpost-Roe-specifically, abortion procedure'"
sidiary abortion issues 12raised
6
and abortion funding.

The abortion procedure regulations typically attempt to attach a number
of conditions to the right to an abortion, for example, requiring consent
of the woman's spouse or parents, or regulating the physicians who
perform abortions. Spousal consent requirements have been struck down
by the Court under the privacy doctrine as unconstitutional because, since
the state lacks the power to regulate abortion during the first trimester,
it cannot require a spouse's consent to an abortion during that period.' 27
From an equality approach, it is clear that a regulation requiring spousal
consent for an abortion would be unconstitutional as such a regulation is
a paternalistic one, reminisicent of the Bradwell era,' 28 where legislators
regarded the male more as the female's guardian than as her peer.
As to the question of parents' or judges' consent to abortion for minors,
the issue is more difficult. Under a privacy approach, the Court has held
that the state cannot impose a blanket requirement that an unmarried
minor obtain parental consent before having an abortion during her first
trimester.129 However, as the Court held in Bellotti v. Baird,'30 the state
can require parental consent for an abortion if it also provides an alter122. See supra notes 10-17 and accompanying text.
123. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
124. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
125. Abortion procedure decisions include: Planned Parenthood of Kansas City, Mo., v. Ashcroft,
462 U.S. 476 (1983); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983);
H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398 (1981); Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti If), 443 U.S. 622 (1979); Colautti
v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379 (1979); Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth, 428 U.S.
52 (1976).
126. Abortion funding decisions include: Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Poelker v. Doe,
432 U.S. 519 (1977); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 US. 438 (1977).
127. See, e.g., Danforth, 428 U.S. at 69.
128. Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. (16 Wall) 130 (1872); see supra notes 73-74 and accompanying
text.
129. See Danforth, 428 U.S. at 74.
130. 443 U.S. at 622.

Winter 19871

RECONSIDERING ROE v. WADE

native procedure-a judicial proceeding-in which the maturity of the
minor can be established. 3 ' The purpose of the alternative procedure is
to ensure that the parental consent provision does not "amount to the
'absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto' that was found impermissible in
Danforth."'32
From an equality stance, the central issue is whether the regulation
contributes to the continued oppression of women. As contrasted to spousal
consent, it is much less clear that a parental consent requirement does
perpetuate the inequality of women. Arguably, in view of the unique
status of children under the law, the state has a significant interest in
regulations aimed at protecting children that is not present in the case of
an adult. Thus, as long as the regulation in question is sufficiently tailored
to furthering the legitimate end of supervising the welfare of minors, and
is not a pretext for perpetuating the inequality of women, it likely will
be found constitutional.
With regard to the rights of physicians performing abortions, the Court,
from a privacy approach, has held that the physician must be given
adequate discretion in exercising medical judgment, and in determining
how any abortion should be carried out.' 33 Thus, the state cannot require
the physician performing the abortion to exercise the same care to preserve
the life and health of the fetus as would be required in a situation where
the fetus was intended to be delivered alive,' 34 or require the physician
to adopt the abortion technique providing the best opportunity for the
fetus to be born alive as long as different techniques were not required
to preserve the health or life of the mother,' 35 or require that all abortions
performed after the first trimester of pregnancy be performed in a hospital.' 36 The Court's reasoning in these decisions reaffirms the trimester
approach announced in Roe-the state has no authority to interfere with
the medical judgment encompassing a woman's right to an abortion during
the first trimester.
From an equality perspective, the focus shifts from whether there is a
reasonable medical basis for the regulation, to whether the regulation
131. Id. at 643. The Court stated:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (I) that she
is mature enough and well enough informed to make her abortion decision, in
consultation with her physician, independently of her parents' wishes; or (2)
that even if she is not able to make this decision independently, the desired
abortion would be in her best interests.
Id. at 643-44. See also Matheson, 450 U.S. at 398 (statute requiring parental notice does not violate
the constitutional right of an immature, dependent minor).
132. 443 U.S. at 644.
133. See Akron, 462 U.S. at 427; Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387; see also Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 512.
134. Colautti, 439 U.S. at 387.
135. Id.
136. Akron, 462 U.S. at 433.
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impermissibly perpetuates the inequality of women. From this view, it
is clear that any regulation interfering with the woman's abortion right
inhibits her equality right to take responsibility and make decisions governing her future life and social roles. Thus, because such procedural
regulations do further the oppression of women, strict scrutiny applies,
and such regulations can be sustained only upon a showing of a compelling
state interest. It is likely, therefore, that such regulations would be held
unconstitutional from an equality approach.
The cases discussed above all involved statutes attempting to regulate
the abortion decision-by way of spousal consent, parental consent, or
medical procedure requirements. Such regulatory attempts at restricting
the abortion decision have met with varied success. Undoubtedly, however, the most successful attempts at limiting access to abortion have
come indirectly, through limitations on funding for abortions sought by
those women who cannot afford an abortion without financial assistance.
The issue of public funding for abortion reached the Supreme Court
in 1977.17 With regard to this issue, the Court has held that the state can
limit Medicaid funding for abortions to those abortions certified as "medically necessary,"' 38 and is not required to provide Medicaid funding for
nontherapeutic abortions even though it provides funding for childbirth. 39
'
This is so, the Court has stated, because Roe did not establish an "unqualified 'constitutional right to an abortion.' " 40 That is, Roe established
a woman's right to be free from unduly burdensome interference in her
decision whether to terminate a pregnancy,' 4 ' but this does not establish
a constitutional entitlement to the financial resources to avail herself of
the full range of protected choices. Thus, although the government may
not affirmatively place obstacles in the path of a woman's exercise of her
freedom of choice, Roe does not require that the state remove those
obstacles not of its own creation-such as indigency. 4' 2
From an equality perspective, the abortion funding cases would likely
be unconstitutional because, by requiring that the abortion be certified as
"medically necessary," the decision to abort is taken away from the
women and her physician and rests with a certification board. Such a
limitation on the abortion right clearly affects the continued inequality of
women, and will fail unless justified by a compelling state interest. Sim137. The Court first addressed the issue in a trilogy of cases, Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977),
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), and Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 569 (1977), and considered the
issue most recently in Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
138. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 469.
139. Id. at 466.
140. id. at 473.
141. Id. at 473-74.
142. See McRae, 448 U.S. at 315.
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ilarly, withholding funds for nontherapeutic abortions has a significant
impact in perpetuating the inequality of women. The asserted state interest
in preferring childbirth over abortion cannot be considered compelling;
thus, under a strict scrutiny analysis, this holding is unconstitutional.
Further, although the Court states that the denial of public support for
nontherapeutic abortions does not pose an obstacle to the right to choose
to terminate a pregnancy,143 it clearly does. That denial removes from
poor women desiring to abort a pregnancy the right not merely to secure
an abortion, but, more importantly, to have some control over their reproductive capacities and, accordingly, over their lives. '"Again, from an
equality stance, such a regulation cannot survive constitutional scrutiny.
It appears, therefore, that in abortion procedure cases, an equality
approach reaches essentially the same results as the privacy approach,
however, the justification is somewhat stronger and more soundly reasoned. In the context of abortion funding cases, an equality approach
comes out differently than a privacy approach, and holds unconstitutional
attempts to proscribe an indigent woman's right to procure an abortion.
By making the interests of the woman the central focus of the inquiry,
the equality approach allows the decision maker to focus on appropriate
issues of reproductive choice and responsibilty, rather than balancing the
comparatively abstract interest of encouraging childbirth. Thus, the "new"
equality approach provides a reasonable, and preferable alternative to the
Roe dilemma.
B. CriticalReflections: Problems Created by Adoption of the Equality
Approach
Although the equality approach provides a preferable analysis to regulations limiting a woman's right to an abortion, two criticisms of the
143. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
144. Justice Marshall made the point most forcefully in his dissenting opinion to the funding
cases:
The right of every woman to choose whether to bear a child is, as Roe v. Wade
held, of fundamental importance. An unwanted child may be disruptive and
destructive of the life of any woman, but the impact is felt most by those too
poor to ameliorate those effects. If funds for an abortion are unavailable, a
poor woman may feel that she is forced to obtain an illegal abortion that poses
a serious threat to her health and even her life. . . . If she refuses to take this
risk, and undergoes the pain and danger of state-financed pregnancy and childbirth, she may well give up all chance of escaping the cycle of poverty. Absent
day-care facilities, she will be forced into full-time child care for years to come;
she will be unable to work so that her family can break out of the welfare
system or the lowest income brackets. If she already has children, another
infant to feed and clothe may well stretch the budget past the breaking point.
All chance to control the direction of her own life will have been lost.
432 U.S. 440, 458-59 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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approach advocated here deserve brief examination. First, the standard
by which regulations are to be judged under the equality approach, whether
a challenged policy or practice contributes to the oppression of women,
makes it exceedingly difficult to determine what perpetuates sex-based
deprivation and even more difficult to prove such deprivation. Although
it seems clear that most restrictions on abortion fall within this standard,
the question of oppression outside the abortion area will likely prove more
problematic. The difficulty in applying the equality standard is in determining how deep the inquiry must go-how much evidence needs to be
gathered. A subjective standard, such as the test suggested here, may be
requiring too much judicial review-may be too subjective-thereby providing inadequate protection of the equality right; standards that rely
exclusively on judicial discretion are likely to provide weak protection
for the asserted right. It would be helpful, therefore, if a more reliable,
comparative standard were developed, facilitating the equality approach
inquiry.
Second, realistically, in the next few years, finding support for a woman's right to obtain an abortion from a majority of the members of Justices
on the United States Supreme Court, seems unlikely. With President
Reagan's appointment of two Justices already"4 5 and the presence on the
Court of four Justices aged seventy-seven or over,146 it is conceivable that
President Reagan, during the remainder of his second term, could appoint
a majority of the Court. Assuming those appointees adhere to Reagan's
philosophy opposing the right to an abortion, it is possible that the opportunity for women to choose to have an abortion could be eliminated
by the same body that affirmed that right just over a decade ago in Roe
and reaffirmed it as recently as 1986 in Thornburgh.
V. CONCLUSION
The basis for the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade was a
constitutional right of privacy. It is clear, however, that such a basis does
not withstand close scrutiny. Indeed, a brief overview of the development
of the privacy right demonstrates that privacy remains a nebulous concept
which is not amenable to precise definition. Gathered loosely under its
banner is a collection of widely differing legal concepts which are tenuously united by an underlying philosophy that the government should
interfere as little as possible in people's private lives. Yet, a right as
145. Justices O'Connor and Scalia are Reagan appointees.
146. Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Powell and Marshall, all of whom voted with the majority in
Thornburgh as well as Roe, are between the ages of 77 and 80, although none has indicated any
plans to retire. Were President Reagan to have an opportunity to replace one of these four, or Justice
Stevens, 66, the voting lineup might change.
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controversial as that of a woman to procure an abortion deserves a strong,
well defined constitutional basis-one capable of providing adequate protection to such an important women's right.
To secure this right, the Court must acknowledge that the abortion
issue is a women's rights issue; it must align abortion prohibitions with
discrimination against women. Further, the law must embrace a version
of equality that focuses on the real issues-the right of a woman to control
her own body and reproductive capacities, the right of a woman to take
responsibility for her destiny.
This Article advocates an "inequality" approach to equal protection
analysis, suggesting that such an approach is appropriate, indeed preferable, for resolving the dilemma created by the Roe analysis. The inequality approach allows the decision maker to focus on the real issue in
the abortion cases-women's rights-rather than diluting the equality
concern with privacy language.

